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AUTHOR Bertsch, Gary K.
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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the role that comparative analysis and global policy studies can play in explaining the human condition in the contemporary world. It investigates economic well-being, one dimension of the human condition, and examines some of the attributes that represent it and some of the forces that affect it in villages, social groupings, and nation states around the world. A model for a cross-national study is presented and discussed. The author uses available data to compare indicators of economic well-being. Indicators include dietary characteristics; amount of money governments spend annually per capita in health, education, and the military; government expenditures as a percentage of GNP; infant mortality; life expectancy; and basic literacy data. Additional sources of data for use in a cross-national study are discussed. The author then examines additional factors which must be considered in a cross-national study. These include global forces, historical and developmental forces, ideological forces, political culture and political participation, and the impact and power of the state. In the conclusion, the author points out that in a broad and new field of inquiry like global policy studies, we need certain models, frameworks, and theories for definition, guidance, and enrichment. (Author/RM)

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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, GLOBAL POLICY STUDIES AND THE HUMAN CONDITION*

by

Gary K. Bertsch
Department of Political Science

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The Center for Global Policy Studies

University of Georgia
Athens, Georgia 30602

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Comparative Analysis, Global Policy Studies, and the Human Condition

One fourth of the planet's population--over one billion human beings--live in absolute poverty. Absolute poverty, so described to distinguish it from the kind of poverty we know in the West has been described by Robert McNamara as a condition of life so limited as to prevent the realization of the potential of the genes with which people were born; a condition of life so dehumanizing and degrading as to be an insult to human dignity. But this is only one small element of the human condition in the modern world. What else do we know, and need to know, about the human condition on the planet Earth? Is the state of being, or human condition, of coal miners in Poland less desirable than their counterparts in Appalachia? How do we know? If it is true, why? This paper examines the role that comparative analysis and global policy studies can play in explaining the human condition in the contemporary world. It investigates one dimension of the human condition--economic well-being--and examines some of the attributes that represent it and some of the forces that affect it in villages, social groupings and nation-states around the world.

While economic well-being is only one component of the human condition--other important dimensions include peace, social justice, and various spiritual elements--it is a significant one. The elements implicit in economic well-being--health, safety, services, goods, and comfort--are important to people around the globe. The purpose of the paper is to suggest how we can begin to describe the state of well-being globally and to help explain why the state of well-being is what it is. The paper is intended to help define the broad parameters within which more productive comparative research might be conducted. More specifically, the paper will utilize comparative analysis to (1) identify,

describe, and compare some indicators of well-being and some attributes related to it around the globe, and (2) examine the impact of certain forces upon governmental policy and policy outcomes related to economic well-being. Perhaps this will be of some use to other students of global policy studies who will want to analyze the human condition further as well as to those who may want to change it.

Since data on the human condition, and economic well-being, are most often collected, aggregated, and made available on the nation-state level, our comparative analysis and discussion will tend to be cross-national. This cross-national emphasis is, therefore, to some extent a matter of necessity and does not mean that the comparison of individuals, ethnic or economic groups, and certain social groupings is unimportant. Indeed, we would prefer to compare individuals in almost all cases if that were possible. It is certainly important and should be done wherever and whenever possible.

The Nature of Comparative Analysis

In a historical review and stock-taking exercise, Eckstein and Apter contend that "the field of comparative politics has a long and honorable past."[1] They note that the pedigree reaches as far back as Aristotle, and to Cicero, Polybius and Tacitus among the Romans, to Machiavelli in the Renaissance, Montesquieu in the Enlightenment, and to such figures as Tocqueville, Marx, Mill, Bagehot, Mosca and others of the nineteenth century. The comparative analysis of political systems, structures and institutions, the classification of types, and the study of political development, change and revolution are concerns that have drawn considerable attention over the years. While the study of comparative politics may have an honorable past, it is open to certain

criticisms like other areas of scholarly activity. The concern that I want to pursue in this paper is based upon my belief that there has been insufficient comparative study of: 1) what states are doing to improve the human condition and dimensions of it, such as economic well-being; 2) why they are doing what they are; and 3) what effects such actions have had upon individuals, the quality of life, and the course of human dignity. In my opinion, comparativists have been insufficiently concerned with some of the most urgent and pressing problems confronting the world in which they live. While social scientists should strive for objectivity and intellectual honesty, they should not avoid addressing problems with strong normative and ethical implications. The most urgent problems of our time--food and starvation, war and peace, racism and community--require the best we have to offer in normative, scientific and prescriptive analysis. It is unfortunate that most comparativists have failed to provide it. This is particularly disappointing because of the important contributions that comparative analysis can make to addressing the challenges of the modern age.

For example, comparative analysis can contribute to a simple, descriptive understanding of what states are or are not doing. We ought to know that some European governments invest nearly 50% of their national budgets in social security and welfare (e.g., Sweden, West Germany) while others in Europe invest only one half of that (e.g., Finland, United Kingdom). We also ought to know that many Middle Eastern governments spend a high percentage of their GNP on defense (44 percent for Egypt in 1976) while the defense expenditures of European governments as a percentage of GNP is significantly less (around 3.5 percent for West Germany and Czechoslovakia in 1976). Such "univariate" comparison of governmental expenditures can tell us what countries are investing

in human welfare, how much they are putting in defense, foreign aid, and so forth. One issue that should particularly concern us is how governments spend limited resources with particular focus on the magnitude and nature of government involvement in the welfare of its citizens. Of course, we have to take care in using various indicators of governmental involvement and support for human welfare. Later, we will discuss some problems of comparison. For the present, I am simply suggesting that governments are making choices that affect the human condition and human dignity, and we ought to know what they are.

Univariate comparisons can be made of other important attributes in addition to governmental expenditures. For example, we can compare certain indicators of the human condition around the world. We can utilize data of the Overseas Development Council to compare the percentage of a nation's population living in absolute poverty (around 75% in Bangladesh and Ethiopia compared to 5% in Iran and Venezuela).[2] We can utilize the work of Morris D. Morris to examine the physical quality of life in various countries,[3] or the work of Ruth Sivard to compare the economic-social standing or dietary standards of countries around the world.[4] Of course, comparative inquiry should take us beyond the mere description of attributes.

A second example of comparative analysis involves the comparison of relationships. For example, what is the relationship between economic development and the physical quality of life, or ideology and defense spending, or public policy and poverty? What explains the fact that the quality of life or defense expenditures vary so markedly across nations? Why were Egyptian defense expenditures 44 percent of its national budget in 1975, while Israel's were 27 percent and Sudan's 2 percent? Why is the physical quality of life reasonably high in Costa Rica and relatively low in Saudi Arabia even though their per capita incomes are similar? And why did Iran and India have about

the same physical quality of life scores in the 1970s even though Iran's per capita income was nine times that of India's? These questions and the suggested emphasis on exploring relationships take us in the direction of explaining the causes and consequences of the human condition. If we can link certain domestic and global forces (variables) to policies such as defense or welfare spending, or policy outcomes such as the quality of life, we can better understand why states act and perform as they do and what might be done to change their behavior and performance.

Another example of comparative studies and one that I would like to encourage involves the monitoring, assessment and evaluation of governmental performance.[5] Using evaluative criteria such as quantitative indices (e.g., the Physical Quality of Life Index), international standards (e.g., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) or national goals (e.g., the Soviet Five Year Plan), comparativists can monitor and evaluate aspects of governmental performance. By examining bi- and multi-variate relationships, such as the impact of certain policy programs on human welfare while controlling for the level of economic development or certain global forces, we can help explain why some states appear to be more successful than others. In what follows, I will discuss some examples of comparison and their importance in global policy studies by reviewing some relevant research and by suggesting additional research that can be done to more fully understand the many forces affecting the human condition in the contemporary world. Although we can be critical of much of what has been done in comparative politics, it is important to know what has been in order to avoid past mistakes, and perhaps more importantly, build upon that which is useful. There is no need to "reinvent the wheel." As we will see, a considerable body of research and literature is relevant to the evolving field of global policy studies.

Comparative Analysis and Global Policy Studies

I conceive of global policy studies as the study of forces that affect the human condition. I am proposing an ethically motivated, scientifically grounded, multi-disciplinary, international effort to better understand and improve the human condition on the planet Earth. As we will see below some of what we need to know is already known. The challenge now is to fill in the gaps and get on with the task. Figure 1 represents a visual description of some elements of the field of inquiry I am proposing. The conceptual framework suggests a set of independent variables, "global and domestic forces," and two sets of dependent variables, "policy outputs" and "policy outcomes." The global and domestic forces are intended to call attention to some of the most important influences of governmental policy and the human condition. Policy outputs represent those decisions (e.g., expenditures, legislation, programs, strategies) made by governmental units impacting on the human condition.

Figure 1



The arrows in the framework are suggestive and are intended to portray and clarify the elementary relationships to be addressed in this paper. The relationships among forces, outputs and outcomes in the real world are considerably more complex. Like other models, however, Figure 1 represents a simplified description of reality. Obviously, the various forces are interactive and inter-related. Social and economic forces impact on political culture and political culture on policy-making. Similarly, components of the human condition influence one another. Some believe that increases in economic well-being often come at the expense of ecological balance. Certainly, the countries with the most impressive scores on the physical quality of life index are among those which have done the most damage to the environment. Also, the framework does not include arrows describing the feedback loops that are obviously at work. That is, while we use the framework to suggest the impact that external, environmental and political forces have upon governments and policy outputs and upon the human condition, we do not mean to imply that governmental policy and the human condition do not, in return, influence these forces. They obviously do. Close examination of these more complex relationships would bring further clarification and explanatory value to the model. For the present, our concern will be addressed to the more elementary relationships portrayed in Figure 1. We now have a list of variables organized in what is intended to be a logical fashion. In the future we want to work toward the development of a testable model.

The framework is intended to aid the comparativist in identifying the most important attributes (forces, outputs and outcomes) and relationships between and among these attributes (variables) for examination and study. While the model suggests a wide array of forces, few have attempted to deal with all or

many of them simultaneously. As the discussion in succeeding sections of the paper will indicate, many scholars have been involved in univariate analysis (e.g., comparing political attributes, or public expenditures, or economic well-being across systems). Others have utilized bi-variate analysis to look at such relationships as those between economic forces and expenditures or political forces and certain policy outcomes. Far fewer have engaged in multi-variate analysis incorporating three or more variables from the framework. No one has utilized all of the variables in a sophisticated, interactive model. Perhaps this should be a goal for the true globalist.

Political scientists, of course, have traditionally focused on the political variables and relationships. Economists have concentrated on the economic and sociologists on the sociological. As Phil Meeks argues in his essay, global policy studies is truly a multidisciplinary enterprise.[6] Hence our framework should attempt to include all relevant variables.

How does the comparative analysis I am suggesting relate to the field of global policy studies? I think it does in a number of important respects. For example, we want to know what the human condition is across the planet; and, we want to know why it is what it is in slums in New Delhi, ghettos in New York, cities in Europe, communes in China, and so forth. Our concern is also global in the sense that it strives to include all relevant variables in an explanatory system. We are trying to move away from the parochialism of our disciplines and the parochialism of our countries. To carry out global policy studies requires us to do more than political science and study more than the United States or Europe. The cross-national study of forces, outputs, and outcomes I am proposing can also help take us away from the more parochial concerns of case and area studies. While such studies make an important contribution to global policy studies, they do not allow global analysis. On the other hand,

cross-national, comparative studies do by aiding our search for generalizations and universals. Finally, our concern with the human condition is a global concern. The suggested components of the human condition--economic well-being, peace, social justice, ecological balance--are global challenges and cry out for global solutions. We recognize that both challenges and solutions stretch beyond national borders. You can not improve the human condition unless you come to grips with the complex forces that operate outside the local environment and often outside the borders of the nation-state. It seems to me that if we can make some progress in understanding the forces that improve the human condition and those that discourage it, we are making an important contribution to the field of global policy studies.

Comparing Attributes

As noted above one necessary task involves the simple comparison of certain characteristics or attributes related to the human condition. What is the state of the human condition and factors related to it around the world? In order to begin to find out, we can compare the physical quality of life, governmental policies (e.g., expenditures) intended to improve the quality of life, and other such variables. For purposes of this paper, the human condition will be conceived of as an individual's or group's state of being. Of course an individual's state of being has many different dimensions. One way of conceptualizing and categorizing these dimensions is to think of them as values that are important to humans. The concept of human condition and what I am suggesting represents a value-centered approach based upon the assumption that the most important challenges and choices for governments and societies revolve around values that people consider important. Numerous scholars have

have suggested value frameworks to organize such inquiry. Harold Lasswell has offered and utilized an eight value scheme: power, respect, rectitude, affection, wealth, well-being, skills and enlightenment.[7] Robert Johansen has suggested four: peace, economic well-being, social justice, and ecological balance.[8] It is assumed that the higher the presence of these values within an individual or group, the better the human condition. An individual who has ample amounts of all values would be characterized by a more desirable human condition than one who enjoys fewer. Some suggest that a preferred distribution of these values for an individual or society represents human dignity.[9] Since human dignity means different things to different people, and preferred value distributions will vary across individuals, groups and societies, there will never be universal agreement on the ideal distribution of values. Yet, it is clear that there are values that people around the globe seem to desire (e.g., well-being or peace) and the way these values are distributed does have an impact on the human condition.

Such value-centered approaches usually raise the following question: Are such values universally applicable? My own response is they may not be but they can be used profitably for analysis if the analyst uses them sensibly, and specifically, does not assume that there is only one ideal distribution of values in the world. This value centered approach to comparative global policy studies rests, then, on three important assumptions. First, human needs and values should be the guiding focus of our studies. Second, while we will look across political units for patterns and trends, we are guided and motivated by an over-riding global concern. Third, by gaining a fuller understanding of the present, we may be better prepared to deal with the future.

Perhaps one of the most fundamental of all values on the contemporary planet is that of economic well-being. A sizable portion of the world's population is going without an adequate diet, healthcare, social services, and physical security and comfort. We are not suggesting that well-being is the most important value, or that it means the same thing to all people, or that individual or national conditions on this variable are a good predictor of their status on other values. The various values and dimensions of the human condition are complex. Sometimes they may be related, in other cases they are not. As suggested earlier, some have posited an inverse relationship between economic well-being and ecological balance. Others have suggested a positive relationship between social justice and economic well-being. At this point, we simply want to note that there are a variety of complex and important dimensions of the human condition. But, to limit and better define our analysis in this paper, we have chosen to focus on economic well-being.

Now let us focus on comparing attributes of well-being. The first few indicators in Table 1 tell us something about the state of well-being across states. Drawn from Ruth Sivard's handbook on World Military and Social Expenditures, the first column represents an index of social economic standing. The index is based upon eleven different indicators: GNP per capita, five indicators of educational standing and five indicators of health standing.[10] Unfortunately, the Economic-Social Standing index tells us almost nothing about the distribution of well-being within countries. For example, only one of the eleven indicators going into the index (percent of girls in total high school enrollment) begins to reflect the distribution of values within societies. Yet, the index is a useful indicator for examining on a cross-national basis both attributes and relationships.

TABLE I

MILITARY AND SOCIAL INDICATORS

INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC WELL-BEING

140 Countries, 1977

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	Economic-Social Standing[1]	GNP per Capita		NUTRITION Calorie Supply per Capita[2]		Calories as % of Requirements		WATER % Population with Safe Water		HEALTH Public Expenditures per Capita		EDUCATION Public Expenditures per Capita		Health and Education Expenditures as Percentage of GNP	MILITARY Public Expenditure per Capita		Defense Expenditures as Percentage of GNP	Physical Quality of Life Index
	Avg Rank	Rank	US $	Rank	Number	Rank	%	Rank	%	Rank	US $	Rank	US $		Rank	US $		
WORLD			1,838		2,581		108		53		62		98			86		
Developed			5,853		3,387		132		83		230		336			274		
Developing			548		2,320		100		39		8		21			26		
AMERICA																		
North America			8,712		3,518		133		98		319		368			436		
United States*	5	8	9,743	7	3,537	15	134	8	98	12	304	8	557	9.2	7	485	5.3	97
Canada*	7	10	8,428	24	3,348	27	126	8	98	6	480	3	678	12.5	22	167	2.0	95
Latin America			1,260		2,550		107		57		15		42			19		
Argentina	33	45	1,848	23	3,358	25	127	50	86	57	14	64	44	2.1	52	46	2.5	85
Barbados	36	48	1,659	35	3,048	11	135	8	98	37	64	30	144	12.5	118	4	0.2	87
Bolivia	78	76	677	97	2,134	110	88	84	34	83	7	77	28	5.2	82	12	1.8	43
Brazil	54	53	1,443	80	2,522	61	106	59	55	59	13	74	33	3.2	76	18	1.1	69
Chile	47	55	1,250	51	2,644	58	108	47	70	50	25	65	43	5.4	53	45	2.6	77
Colombia	69	71	758	84	2,255	86	97	53	64	83	7	91	18	3.0	103	7	0.9	79
Costa Rica	50	51	1,444	65	2,477	51	111	44	72	70	10	40	95	7.3	92	9	0.6	85
Cuba	42	73	752	52	2,636	47	114	56	56	48	32	44	78	14.4	53	45	6.0	89
Dominican Republic	67	68	823	102	2,197	99	93	59	55	88	11	94	15	3.2	80	14	1.7	69
Ecuador	63	66	854	101	2,189	100	92	81	36	76	8	68	37	5.3	84	26	3.0	68
El Salvador	79	80	641	105	2,075	104	91	61	53	73	9	85	22	4.8	85	11	1.7	69
Guatemala	77	85	858	93	2,186	78	99	76	39	83	7	94	15	2.6	85	11	1.3	59
Guyana	60	67	515	69	2,431	60	107	33	84	63	12	67	40	10.1	88	10	1.9	35
Haiti	117	113	216	115	2,040	106	90	108	12	124	1	138	1	0.9	127	2	0.9	36
Honduras	88	96	426	106	2,074	100	92	74	41	83	12	91	18	6.6	92	9	2.1	51
Jamaica	46	50	1,456	49	2,863	38	119	31	88	41	49	40	95	9.9	85	11	7.6	84
Mexico	60	58	1,153	48	2,668	46	115	54	62	78	8	58	56	5.5	92	9	0.8	73
Nicaragua	68	62	927	67	2,453	55	109	56	56	67	14	80	26	4.3	71	22	2.4	54
Panama	42	56	1,186	73	2,387	70	102	37	77	54	18	51	87	7.3	96	3	0.7	80
Paraguay	71	74	710	43	2,779	36	120	107	13	113	2	103	11	1.8	88	10	1.9	75
Peru	65	71	758	78	2,286	86	97	88	47	73	9	82	25	4.5	78	23	3.0	62
Trinidad & Tobago	42	40	2,831	45	2,684	51	111	21	93	42	48	39	99	5.6	108	8	0.3	85
Uruguay	38	51	1,444	34	3,098	42	118	25	92	58	13	68	37	3.5	71	22	1.5	87
Venezuela	40	39	2,833	63	2,480	76	100	41	75	34	74	31	142	8.2	56	43	1.6	77
EUROPE																		
NATO Europe			5,281		3,332		130		91		272		287			194		
Belgium*	17	13	8,195	4	3,565	11	135	28	88	11	329	9	532	10.5	14	255	2.3	96
Denmark*	4	7	8,910	17	3,432	23	128	1	99	2	573	6	602	13.2	17	307	3.9	94
France*	10	16	7,214	12	3,458	8	137	14	87	8	398	15	416	11.3	11	281	3.3	93
Germany, West*	6	11	8,415	22	3,362	27	128	1	99	4	477	19	345	9.8	10	282	3.3	89
Greece	32	33	2,901	16	3,441	6	138	52	85	31	83	62	49	4.5	23	184	5.6	
Iceland*	8	12	8,387	40	2,939	49	113	1	99	3	486	23	275	9.1		—	—	76
Italy*	24	28	3,360	11	3,462	8	137	21	86	23	185	28	168	9.9	34	88	2.6	92
Luxembourg*	18	8	9,419	4	3,585	11	135	8	98	32	81	12	511	6.3	35	81	0.9	92
Netherlands*	15	14	7,710	25	3,324	32	124	14	97	5	481	5	655	14.5	13	273	3.5	96
Norway*	3	9	8,592	32	3,126	40	117	8	98	6	460	4	660	13.8	12	276	3.2	96
Portugal	42	47	1,784	18	3,424	2	140		na	40	53	53	85	6.7	45	58	3.3	80
Turkey	73	59	1,142	41	2,916	42	118	48	68	73	9	55	82	6.2	43	63	5.5	55
United Kingdom*	16	24	4,388	26	3,305	20	131	1	99	20	209	21	281	11.2	16	213	4.9	99
ALL NATO (incl US and Canada)			6,747		3,412		131		94		292		407			298		
Warsaw Pact			3,392		3,470		135		80		78		154			276		
Bulgaria*	26	35	2,840	3	3,584	1	144		na	39	57	37	110	5.9	42	68	2.4	91
Czechoslovakia*	20	28	4,234	13	3,450	2	140	35	76	24	135	33	128	6.2	25	128	3.0	93
Germany, East*	14	22	5,094	2	3,610	6	138	34	82	28	112	25	204	6.2	19	190	3.7	93
Hungary*	29	32	3,094	9	3,494	17	133	72	44	34	74	34	119	6.2	40	88	0.2	91
Poland*	27	30	3,303	1	3,647	5	139	88	47	27	117	38	111	6.9	30	108	3.3	91
Romania*	31	37	2,780	21	3,368	25	127		na	42	48	47	70	4.2	53	45	2.6	90
USSR*	24	29	3,326	14	3,443	15	134		na	36	78	27	169	7.2	8	348	10.5	91
Other Europe			4,314		3,295		130		83		190		226			183		
Albania	55	77	665	53	2,624	55	108		na	78	10	74	33	6.5	47	55	8.3	75
Austria*	11	20	6,375	6	3,547	11	135	28	88	12	304	17	352	10.3	38	73	1.1	93
Finland*	9	21	6,245	31	3,130	42	118	44	72	18	352	13	467	13.1	32	92	1.5	94
Ireland*	21	34	2,883	8	3,519	2	140	43	73	22	173	26	179	12.2	36	52	1.8	93
Malta	33	46	1,846	33	3,183	36	125	42	74	36	83	52	68	7.0	75	21	1.1	87
Spain	28	31	3,205	27	3,218	21	130	35	78	29	94	45	74	5.2	48	84	1.7	91
Sweden*	1	5	9,460	29	3,166	39	118	1	99	1	644	2	798	15.2	9	325	3.4	97
Switzerland*	2	4	10,025	20	3,386	27	126	18	96	9	356	10	522	9.8	18	206	2.0	95
Yugoslavia	48	43	2,094	10	3,469	8	137		na	32	81	37	110	9.1	31	96	4.6	89

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	Economic-Social Standing[1]	GNP		NUTRITION				WATER		HEALTH		EDUCATION		Health and Education Expenditures as Percentage of GNP	MILITARY			Physical Quality of Life Index
		per Capita		Calorie Supply per Capita		Calories as % of Requirements		% Population with Safe Water		Public Expenditures per Capita		Public Expenditures per Capita			Public Expenditures per Capita		Defense Expenditures as Percentage of GNP	
	Avg Rank	Rank	US $	Rank	Number	Rank	%	Rank	%	Rank	US $	Rank	US $		Rank	US $		
AFRICA			506		2,262		97		30		6		25			20		
Algeria	75	80	1,119	73	2,357	80	98	37	77	63	12	42	93	9.4	63	28	2.5	91
Angola	112	107	287	111	2,063	115	88		na	89	5	107	18	5.2		—		16
Benin	118	118	199	95	2,153	94	94	84	34	104	3	86	41	23.1	124	3	1.5	23
Botswana	86	82	560	107	2,076	110	89	70	42	63	12	107	10	3.9		—		51
Burundi	129	128	134	83	2,260	86	97		na	124	1	88	37	27.9	124	3	2.2	23
Cameroon	104	99	380	70	2,408	65	104	67	32	104	3	124	4	4.8	106	6	1.5	27
Central African Rep	127	121	191	86	2,255	76	100		na	104	3	99	14	9.7	116	4	2.1	19
Chad	137	132	121	131	1,783	131	75	90	26	124	1	115	8	7.4	106	6	5.0	18
Congo	90	89	481	88	2,234	74	101	78	38	78	8	129	3	2.3	87	25	5.2	27
Equatorial Guinea	105	93	442		na		na		na	94	4	101	13	3.2	71	22	5.0	28
Ethiopia	140	134	109	130	1,836	129	79	113	8	124	1	133	2	2.3	111	8	9.6	20
Gabon	67	38	2,638	71	2,403	87	103	116	1	46	42	32	138	6.2	81	29	1.1	21
Gambia	121	116	202	79	2,281	90	96	108	12	89	5	110	9	6.9		—	—	25
Ghana	95	84	540	119	2,014	115	88	87	35	89	5	85	22	5.0	87	42	7.8	35
Guinea	125	119	196	126	1,921	124	83	104	14	94	4	103	11	7.4	116	4	2.0	20
Ivory Coast	97	78	808	57	2,563	51	111	104	14	59	13	45	89	10.1	96	8	1.0	28
Kenya	100	105	293	112	2,060	110	89	98	17	89	5	94	15	6.3	88	10	3.1	39
Lesotho	99	111	256	96	2,138	94	94	88	17	113	2	110	9	9.3		—	—	48
Liberia	102	92	446	72	2,374	87	103	103	15	78	8	94	15	5.1	116	4	0.9	26
Libya	33	19	6,478	38	2,946	30	125	30	87	30	84	18	354	6.7	27	125	1.9	85
Madagascar	101	112	219	63	2,480	55	109	91	25	94	4	110	9	5.9	111	8	2.3	41
Malawi	128	127	150	79	2,282	80	96		na	113	2	124	4	9.0	124	3	—	39
Mali	138	134	109	100	2,114	106	90		na	124	1	122	5	5.5	116	4	0.9	45
Mauritania	125	106	289	128	1,894	126	82	98	17	104	3	89	17	6.9	60	30	10.4	17
Mauritius	58	75	700	58	2,557	49	113	55	60	52	20	61	52	10.3	132	1	—	71
Morocco	98	82	560	56	2,568	61	106	63	36	83	7	71	38	7.7	59	38	6.8	48
Mozambique	130	129	135	125	1,930	126	82		na	124	1	133	2	2.1	111	8	3.7	25
Niger	135	123	172	113	2,051	119	87	89	27	113	2	118	7	5.2	127	2	1.2	13
Nigeria	103	81	570	77	2,291	86	97		na	83	7	84	23	5.3	63	28	1.9	25
Rwanda	124	125	184	81	2,277	80	98	48	68	124	1	124	6	3.4	116	4	2.4	27
Senegal	118	101	388	89	2,228	94	94		na	94	4	182	12	9.5	96	8	2.2	35
Sierra Leone	122	117	300	103	2,181	104	91	108	12	104	3	115	8	5.5	127	2	0.1	27
Somalia	131	131	131	98	2,129	100	92	78	38	94	4	119	7	8.9	88	10	3.6	19
South Africa	72	37	624	38	2,945	36	120		na	89	5	56	81	4.6	36	80	18.3	53
Sudan	109	102	348	87	2,247	90	96	85	50	104	3	103	11	2.0	80	14	4.0	36
Swaziland	87	85	530	80	2,281	80	98	80	37	70	10	76	31	7.7	127	2	0.4	35
Tanzania	108	115	208	104	2,089	106	90	78	38	94	4	107	10	6.7	96	8	3.3	31
Togo	110	108	279	116	2,035	115	88	102	16	104	3	87	21	5.6	103	7	2.5	27
Tunisia	76	69	822	30	2,857	81	111	67	49	52	20	60	55	9.1	61	27	3.2	77
Uganda	110	104	327	107	2,070	110	89	82	35	94	4	110	9	4.1	96	8	2.9	90
Upper Volta	139	133	112	120	1,997	121	84	91	25	124	1	129	3	3.6	116	4	3.6	K
Zaire	112	122	183	75	2,312	65	104	96	19	113	2	110	9	6.0	106	6	3.3	32
Zambia	85	94	441	118	2,018	119	87	73	42	58	13	78	27	9.1	106	8	4.7	28
Zimbabwe	93	90	475	59	2,545	61	106		na	73	8	89	17	6.5	61	29	6.1	74

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	Economic Social Standing[2]	GNP per Capita		NUTRITION Calorie Supply per Capita		Calories as % of Requirements		WATER % Population with Safe Water		HEALTH Public Expenditures per Capita		EDUCATION Public Expenditures per Capita		Healthand Education Expenditures as % of GNP	MILITARY Public Expenditures per Capita		Defense Expenditures as Percentage of GNP	Physical Quality of Life Index
	Asn Rank	Rank	US $	Rank	Number	Rank	%	Rank	%	Rank	US $	Rank	US $		Rank	US $		
ASIA																		
Middle East			1,878		2,753		112		73		30		108			237		
Bahrain	38	25	4,291		na		na	1	99	21	180	29	164	2.0	29	112	2.4	61
Cyprus	51	44	1,868	36	3,047	33	123	40	95	51	24	57	59	4.4	58	41	2.1	85
Egypt[1]	85	86	520	45	2,716	58	108	21	93	78	8	78	27	6.7	28	119	23.9	43
Iran	64	42	2,102	28	3,193	18	132	63	51	47	33	35	118	7.2	15	222	10.6	93
Iraq	86	49	1,584	76	2,308	98	96	40	76	73	9	58	58	4.1	24	138	8.7	95
Israel*	22	37	4,118	30	3,145	34	122	1	99	25	127	12	280	9.9	2	1,045	25.4	89
Jordan	81	78	657	110	2,467	121	84	37	77	68	11	80	26	5.6	40	59	10.5	77
Kuwait	23	3	12,518		na		na	27	89	19	231	11	520	6.9	6	659	5.7	79
Lebanon	53		na	62	2,495	74	101	25	92		na	73	35	NA	67	25	NA	79
Oman	74	61	2,570		na		na	62	52	44	47	43	91	5.9	4	844	31.3	NA
Qatar	30	2	13,009		na		na	14	97	15	235	1	2,131	12.2	1	1,257	9.7	31
Saudi Arabia	56	13	7,335	66	2,472	70	107	14	97	26	125	7	561	9.3	3	939	12.9	29
Syria	80	66	854	54	2,619	64	105	46	71	94	4	63	48	6.1	25	130	17.7	54
United Arab Emirates	49	1	14,418		na		na		na	15	264	20	288	3.2	5	822	5.7	29
Yemen, Arab Rep	123	95	435	82	2,179	105	90	115	4	103	2	124	4	4.4	78	16	3.7	27
Yemen, People's Dem Rep	106	103	343	127	1,897	129	77	21	93	94	4	NA	14	6.2	67	25	7.1	33
South Asia			152		1,962				32		2		4			5		
Afghanistan	133	114	217	122	1,974	128	61	112	8	124	1	129	3	4.9	116	4	1.9	15
Bangladesh	133	137	75	124	1,945	121	84	56	56	124	1	138	1	2.7	132	1	1.3	35
India	114	126	154	123	1,938	115	88	88	31	113	2	122	5	4.5	111	5	3.2	43
Nepal	136	126	101	107	2,070	94	94	113	8	124	1	133	2	4.9	132	1	1.0	25
Pakistan	119	120	192	84	2,255	80	98	91	25	124	1	124	4	2.6	32	12	6.2	33
Sri Lanka	84	109	262	114	2,043	100	92	96	19	94	4	115	8	4.6	127	2	0.8	82
Far East			850		2,413		103		43		23		40			25		
Burma	115	130	133	90	2,211	70	102	94	17	124	1	133	2	2.3	111	8	3.3	51
Cambodia	116		na	129	1,857	124	83	70	45		na		na	NA		na	NA	40
China	82	100	375	68	2,439	70	102		na	88	6	94	15	5.4	71	22	5.9	69
Indonesia	107	110	259	99	2,115	80	98	111	11	113	2	119	7	3.5	96	8	3.1	48
Japan*	11	18	8,517	42	2,847	34	122	8	98	16	247	16	383	9.9	44	80	0.9	96
Korea, North	82	79	848	44	2,730	40	117		na	113	2	88	19	3.6	45	58	9.1	NA
Korea, South	89	80	879	47	2,682	47	114	80	66	113	2	83	24	3.0	48	53	6.0	82
Laos	132	138	86	121	1,979	110	89	74	41	124	1	133	2	3.5	82	8	16.5	21
Malaysia	58	61	918	58	2,594	42	116	84	34	58	17	83	65	8.5	51	49	5.1	66
Mongolia	52	64	810	61	2,510	67	103		na	63	12	47	70	5.9	36	78	9.0	NA
Philippines	92	91	450	54	2,715	93	95	85	50	104	3	116	8	2.9	82	12	2.6	71
Singapore	37	36	2,794	37	3,036	18	132	18	96	45	43	46	71	4.1	21	179	4.9	83
Taiwan	62	57	1,180		na		na			113	2	103	11	1.1	33	90	7.8	86
Thailand	89	98	422	91	2,193	78	99	91	25	104	3	91	16	4.5	78	15	3.5	68
Vietnam	93	124	187	117	2,032	94	94	104	14	124	1	129	3	2.9	78	16	9.6	59
Oceania			3,558		3,418		129		58		246		347			138		
Australia*	11	17	7,028	18	3,413	23	128		na	12	304	14	443	10.4	20	184	2.4	95
Fiji	48	54	1,279		na		na		na	49	29	49	89	7.7	103	7	0.5	91
New Zealand*	18	23	4,440	14	3,443	21	130	21	93	17	238	24	254	11.1	37	78	1.2	94
Papua New Guinea	91	88	505		na		na	95	20	58	15	71	36	10.1	96	8	1.6	37

* Developed
— none or negligible na not available

2. Represents average of ranks for GNP per capita, education, and health.

7. Per capita supply of food, including fish, in calories.

The next two columns in Table 1 reflect the rank and levels of GNP per capita across states. Although national data such as these are notoriously unreliable, particularly in some countries, they can provide useful indicators if used with care. The GNP per capita indicator calls attention to the great contrasts between the developed states of the North and the developing of the South ($5,853 versus $548), between the U.S. and some of its neighbors ($8,743 versus $641 for El Salvador and $216 for Haiti), and among other combinations of states. Although a possible indicator of the economic and social well-being of populations, it also suffers because of its insensitivity to the investment and distribution of resources within countries. The distribution of wealth may vary considerably among both individuals and groups in a society, and the proportion of GNP invested in the social realm may vary markedly from one country to another. For example, although countries may have identical GNP per capita levels, some may distribute and invest the resources rather equally among their populations while others may distribute them very unequally. Furthermore, some states may spend most of their resources in the military sector while others invest the majority in social programs. While useful in some respects, the GNP per capita indicator is not sensitive to these investment and distribution issues.

The next six columns in Table 1 allow us to compare other indicators of well-being--namely, certain dietary characteristics--across states. Like other social and economic indicators, the data call attention to the great contrasts in the world. While 98 percent of the American people have access to safe drinking water, less than 15 percent of their South American neighbors in Haiti and Paraguay do. It seems to me that this does tell us something of fundamental importance about the human condition. However, while representing

helpful indicators for cross-national comparison, they obviously do not tell us all we need to know. For example, maldistribution of safe water and food within countries may mean individual diets and safe drinking vary significantly from these national averages.

But what are governments doing to improve the human condition and the value of well-being in their societies? The next few columns in Table 1 tell us how much money governments spend annually per capita in health, education, and the military. Among other things, these indicators tell us something about a country's priorities and what they are trying to do. When we examine U.S. expenditures per capita across the three sectors, we find that relatively similar amounts are invested per capita in each ($304 in health, $537 in education, and $465 in military). In contrast, the priority in the USSR is decidedly on the military ($70 in health, $169 in education, and $348 in military), while in Sweden it is on health and education ($644 in health, $789 in education, and $325 in military). The data also tell us something about what countries have available to spend. While the U.S., USSR and Sweden have considerable resources to invest in all three sectors, a country such as Haiti has little to invest annually in any sector ($1 in health, $1 in education, and $2 in military). The developed countries spend an average per capita of $230 in health, $336 in education and $274 in military, while the developing countries spend $8, $21 and $26 respectively. As we will discuss later, the level of economic development is a powerful predictor of public expenditures.

Another useful way of looking at what governments do that affects the human condition is to examine their expenditures as a percentage of GNP. The next two columns in Table 1 provide data on health and education expenditures

and defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP. The summary figures below select a few cases for closer examination and comparison:

	Health and Education Expenditures as a % of GNP	Defense Expenditures as a % of GNP
Sweden	15.2%	3.4%
U.S.	8.8%	6.0%
Switzerland	8.8%	2.0%
USSR	7.2%	11.9%
Saudi Arabia	9.3%	12.8%
Iran	7.2%	14.2%
Israel	9.9%	27.7%
Egypt	6.7%	44.3%

While most states above invest relatively similar amounts of their GNP in health and education (Sweden is clearly the deviant case spending twice the percentage as some others), there is considerable variation in the defense figures. The countries in the Middle East (particularly Egypt and Israel) spend a much greater amount of their GNP on defense. While their expenditures in health and education do not appear to suffer unduly, one must question how this level of defense spending is affecting the human condition.

Looking at these expenditure figures in more global terms also suggests some important and interesting findings and trends. Surprisingly, military expenditures internationally constitute a relatively small amount of global GNP and have actually decreased from 7.06 percent in 1960 to 5.21 percent in 1976. Although this might belie apparent trends toward an escalating global arms race, the decrease is concentrated in heavily industrialized nations. Defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP have increased 300 percent from 1.78 percent to 5.38 percent during the 1960-1976 period for developing countries. The implications of these figures are therefore most significant for the Third and Fourth World countries in their early stages of development.

Increasing defense spending and militarization of many developing societies may inhibit their economic potential and do further damage to the human condition of their people. The military sector competes with the civilian sector for scarce scientific and management talents, raw materials and resources, and transportation facilities. Comparative examination of public expenditures, both cross-temporal and cross-national, can draw attention to some important indicators of and variables related to the human condition.

The final column in Table 1 contains data purporting to reflect the "physical quality of life." The indicator is based on infant mortality, life expectancy and basic literacy data and is claimed to be an unbiased, non-ideological and non-ethnocentric index reflecting important elements that should be included in a human existence.[11] How do states compare on this indicator of well-being? How do various groups within states compare?[12] Rankings of countries worldwide range from a high of 97 for Sweden to lows of 18 for Afghanistan and 12 for Guinea-Bissau. Although the reasons for these differences and the relationships between the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) and other variables such as socio-economic development will be examined in greater detail in the next section of the paper, we should note here that poor countries tend to have low PQLI's, while high income countries tend to have high PQLI's. Yet, the relationships between GNP and PQLI are not all that close. Deviations exist at all levels of income but they are particularly evident at the upper and lower levels of the per capita income range. This raises some important questions for the comparativist. For example, what explains these deviations? For the present, we will simply note that the index supplements our judgments of well-being and does provide

a useful variable that allows cross-national and cross-temporal analysis of relationships. In the next section we will examine why the quality of life varies so significantly across states.

There are obviously far more data sources reflecting on the human condition than included in Table 1. There are those prepared by international organizations, such as the U.N.'s various yearbooks[13] and other U.N. related publications.[14] Since 1948, the International Monetary Fund has published International Financial Statistics providing standardized and detailed data on operations of central governments and summary data for state and local governments.[15] While researchers should be cautious about errors and distortions, national governments publish extensive data on social, economic, and demographic issues. Finally, academic efforts such as the Yale Political Data Program[16], the Cross-Polity Survey,[17] and SUNY's publications[18] add to the wealth of data on the human condition, and on governmental policies and other domestic and global forces related to it.

Again, we should note that aggregate data such as those reported in Table 1 and mentioned above poorly define and often obscure the complex individual elements and dynamics of the human condition. While they help define the human condition of large groups of people, they often tell us little about the social and psychological characteristics of individuals. These characteristics and issues should not be ignored. It should be noted that there have been some noteworthy efforts to collect and analyze such individual level data over the years. Hadley Cantril's work on the Pattern of Human Concerns,[19] Daniel Lerner's The Passing of Traditional Society, Philip Jacob's Values and the Active Community, and Alex Inkeles' Becoming Modern,[20] and others are important efforts to delve into the individual dynamics of social change, values, and the human condition. In addition, worldwide public opinion polling using the latest survey research methods, even in Communist states, is adding more individual

level data to our data banks.[21] The cross-national use of individual level data in conjunction with aggregate data is an important and rewarding application of contextual analysis. For example, what impact does rapid socio-economic change and increases in the physical quality of life have cross-nationally upon certain spiritual and psychological dimensions of the human condition? Such questions can be asked and at least partially answered given present data resources.

Perhaps it is appropriate to conclude this section by noting that while there are considerable data which tell us something about the state of well-being across states and what governments are attempting to do to promote it, we should be sensitive to the gaps and problems in the data and endeavor to do something about them. While there are far more data problems than we have time to discuss here, a few should be mentioned.

For example, there is the problem of <u>reliability</u>. Are the data reliable and accurate? Did those reporting and tabulating make any errors? Were there any willful distortions by governments or individuals to mislead others about their country? Then there is the issue of <u>validity</u>. Does the indicator actually indicate what it is supposed to indicate? Just as a thermometer measures only bodily heat and not the overall state of individual health, public expenditures for health do not tell us about the overall state of healthcare in a country. Public expenditure data often mask the influence of the private sector. Quality healthcare can be provided in the absence of impressive expenditures. There are groups of caring people who support, nurse and nourish one another in the absence of modern hospitals and costly "cat scanners." Quality education can also be provided in the absence of modern facilities, expensive equipment, and other things that require lavish expenditures. There are good schools that meet in the open air of tropical countries, and effective teachers who earn less

than $1000 a year. One way to improve the validity of measurements is to avoid single indicators and attempt to include qualitative, nonethnocentric indicators in a more comprehensive index.[22]

Another problem in comparative studies is that of functional equivalence. Do the indicators tap the same underlying dimension in different countries? When examining expenditures for social welfare, for example, we must recognize that social welfare means rather different things in different countries. In addition, some countries support welfare through government expenditures while others tend to do it privately through families, voluntary associations and the like. Other indicators and conceptions of the human condition--for example, human rights--incur the problem of functional equivalence and are often susceptible to ethnocentrism. Because of cultural, social and political differences around the globe, comparativists must take care to measure and compare what they say they are.

Comparing Relationships

What do we know about forces impacting on the human condition? Why is the state of economic well-being higher in some states than in others? Why do some governments appear to be more supportive of the welfare of their peoples than others? Why have some governments been able to raise the physical quality of life in settings of economic stringency while others in similar settings have had little or no success? Our search for answers and explanations requires us to focus on relationships. For example, what is the relationship between economic development and the quality of life, or ideology and public expenditures?

Before we begin to examine some of the forces that impact on governmental policy and the human condition, we should be reminded of some of the potential pitfalls encountered in this line of comparative inquiry. Of foremost importance is the problem of inferential fallacies. To avoid the ecological fallacy we must remember that correlatives of aggregated data for a group may not hold for individual members of that group. Robinson's classic example pointed to a highly negative statistical correlation between levels of literacy and percentage of black inhabitants.[23] The hasty conclusion that blacks tend to be illiterates would be false since the correlation of data on the individual level washes out the relationship almost entirely. This fallacy is a troublesome one when using aggregated data such as that listed in Table 1.

The opposite of the ecological fallacy is the individualistic fallacy which would attribute to a group the characteristics of an individual. To assume that motivation among individuals will universally produce citizens with a higher quality of life does not mean, necessarily, that the nation with the most motivated citizens will have the highest quality of life. Third, the universal fallacy occurs when the analyst fails to notice that the presence or absence of a statistically significant relationship between a pair of variables for a universe may cover up a rather different relationship for the same variables within subgroups. A good example of this fallacy is the following. The correlated relationship between PQLI and per capita GNP for the universe of 114 countries is .79. However, when breaking the universe of 114 into four subgroups, the following relationships are found:

Low Income Countries (N=35)	.17
Lower Middle Income Countries (N=28)	.24
Upper Middle Income Countries (N=45)	.45
High Income Countries (N=29)	.28

GNP per capita is obviously a better predictor of PQLI in some countries than it is in others. Finally, there are other inferential fallacies--selective, contextual, historical and cross-sectional--of which the comparativist focusing on relationships should be aware.[24]

Many of the variables and relationships of interest to the comparativist are unfortunately devoid of empirical indicators. The comparativist should attempt to develop functionally equivalent concepts and variables no matter how primitive. Finally, comparativists must be able to make judgments when little or no data exist. Many of the concepts with which we work are not easily amenable to quantitative operationalization.

Global Forces. What impact do global forces have upon the human condition? While states are powerful actors, much of what happens to their citizens today is beyond their control. The impact of the world energy crisis upon domestic economies and economic policy and the impact of the superpowers upon client states are but two examples in a long list of external forces. The literature, some of which is summarized below, reflects a growing recognition of the importance of the forces outlined in Figure 1.[25]

International developments such as wars can have a powerful effect on states, governmental welfare policies, and people. Maurice Bruce has noted that "the decisive event in the evolution of the [British] Welfare state was the Second World War."[26] The war brought about both nationalized industry and social insurance and services. British social service spending rose from 37.6 percent to 46.1 percent of total government expenditures between 1938 and 1950. Defense spending fell from almost 30 percent to less than 20 percent of total spending in the same period. Others agree with Bruce and suggest that WWII was the decisive event bringing a flowering of the welfare state.[27] Still others

argue that the War brought about the national security or "warfare" state.[28] While the causative role of WWII in the "welfare-warfare nexus" is complex and much of the research is open to question and further investigation, we cannot deny or disregard the impact of wars. The influence of Viet Nam upon the Great Society programs in the U.S. and the Cold War upon defense spending in East and West suggest that more limited wars can also impact in significant ways upon governmental policies and welfare outcomes.

International economic crises and trends can also impact on a country's physical quality of life, economic-social standing, and public expenditures. The struggle of the Third World nations for a "New International Economic Order" is based upon the assumption that the structure and operation of the existing international economic system has a negative,discriminating impact on less developed states. The contemporary global energy shortage, inflationary trends, and patterns of international monetary exchange are impacting upon the economies, policies, and well-being in developing and developed states alike. Kindleberger's study of the Great Depression brought attention to the spread across national boundaries of enormous decreases in wages and prices, in investments and trade, and other catastrophic economic consequences; and Cameron's comparative study of the public economy found that the openness of the economy (dependence on external economic conditions) is a powerful determinant of the expansion of welfare services.[29]

The influence of foreign states upon the policies of others also represents a significant relationship worthy of comparative analysis. The various types of influence can be conceptualized in terms of Rosenau's penetrative, reactive and emulative categorizations.[30] American penetration of Western Europe, particularly in the post-WWII era, and Soviet penetration of Eastern Europe, are examples of the impact of superpowers on the policies and human condition

in others. Clearly, there have been significant relationships for decades between the desires of the U.S. and USSR and the allocation of values (and choices between welfare and warfare) in these other systems. The Soviet Union has had a major impact on the human condition in the East European states over the postwar era; the United States has also had a powerful impact in Western Europe. However, present trends towards greater nationalism may suggest decreasing penetrative relationships and an increase in reaction and interreaction. A European Communities economist notes that policy choices made in the European states are strongly influenced by decisions of the other side of the Atlantic.[31] Others might add that they are also affected by events and decisions on the other side of the Oder-Neisse and in Japan. Some note that the U.S. is reacting in important respects to the problems and policies of the Europeans and other industrialized countries.[32] Defense spending in the NATO countries in the 1970s and early 80s has become highly interactive. Emulation also describes certain relationships between foreign countries and the policies of others. Albert has argued: "The American example is. . . at the root of the frame of reference adopted in Europe, especially in such matters as educational policy, the relations between industries and the universities, and a better awareness on the part of the government of its responsibilities towards workers and firms."[33] Although this may have been truer in the European past than it is in the present, emulation is still a significant influence at work in the world.

There are many opportunities for comparative studies of the relationships between external forces--e.g., wars, economic trends, foreign states--and the human condition and well-being indicators such as those discussed in the preceding section and listed in Table 1. For example, what is the relationship between dependence on external economic conditions and welfare services? While Cameron and a few others have begun to raise these questions, much work remains to be done.

Historical and Developmental Forces. Global Policy Studies must also consider the impact of environmental forces on the human condition. Figure 1 calls attention to some of these, including historical, ideological and socio-economic forces. Our consideration of environmental determinants is rooted in the ideas of Social Darwinism and the notion that humans (and the human condition) are creatures of their environment.

What, if anything, about a country's past helps explain contemporary policy and policy outcomes? Furthermore, what cultural, socio-economic, or political forces in the history of a country are significant determinants of its physical quality of life? Table 2 shows changes in the PQLI for 34 countries from circa 1950 to circa 1970. Although Morris notes that these PQLI's should be used with caution, they suggest some interesting differences and relationships worthy of the comparativist's attention.[34] For example, India showed slow growth in per capita income, yet exhibited significant improvement in its PQLI over the 1950-70 period. Despite an identical per capita GNP growth rate and a level of income considerably higher than India's, Algeria exhibited considerably less PQLI improvement. Using Morris' Disparity Reduction Rate (DRR), India's average annual POLI improvement (1.7 percent) was three times that of Algeria's (0.6 percent) during the 20 year period. Bulgaria's DRR* (5.6 percent) was considerably higher than both. To what extent are historical and developmental forces responsible for these differences? Morris feels that it is essential to examine each case individually in order to be able to interpret historical data.

Although such individual analysis and case studies are useful, the comparativist should attempt to identify relationships that hold across cases

*The DRR measures the rate at which the disparity between a country's PQLI performance and the best projected performance (100) decreased between two periods. Thus, a high DRR indicates a rapid annual reduction.

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Table 2 PQLI Performance and Per Capita GNP Growth Rates for Various Countries, circa 1950, 1960, and 1970 (ranked by "1950" PQLI)

	PQLI			Average Annual DRR, 1950s-70s[1]	Avg. Annual Per Capita GNP Growth Rate, 1950-70
	circa 1950	circa 1960	circa 1970	(%)	(%)
India	14	30	40	1.7	1.8
Turkey	30	42	55	2.1	3.5
Egypt	32	42	43[2]	0.8	1.2
Algeria	34	36	41	0.6	1.8
Nicaragua	42	53	54[2]	1.2	3.2
Malaysia	47	47	67	2.2	2.3
Colombia	47	66	71[2]	3.1	1.6
Ecuador	48	60	68[2]	2.7	2.0
Réunion	48	60	70	3.4	—
El Salvador	51	61	64[2]	1.5	2.0
Brazil	53	63	66	1.6	2.7
Mauritius	55	67	71[2]	2.4	-1.9
Mexico	55	65	71	2.3	3.1
Philippines	55	60	72	2.2	2.6
Thailand	55	58	70	1.7	3.8
Venezuela	58	69	79	3.2	3.0
Portugal	62	69	80[2]	3.2	—
Chile	62	65	77	2.8	1.5
Taiwan	63	77	87	5.1	5.3
Sri Lanka	65	75	80	3.4	1.9
Costa Rica	67	78	86	3.7	2.4
Jamaica	68	80	87	4.6	4.7
Panama	68	73	81	2.5	3.2
Trinidad	69	81	87	4.1	4.0
Martinique	72	78	86	4.2	—
Cyprus	72	82	85[2]	2.8	3.8
Bulgaria	74	79	89	5.6	—
Puerto Rico	74	83	91	5.2	—
Argentina	77	82	85	2.1	1.9
Hungary	80	87	90	3.2	—
Greece	82	84	88	2.4	5.8
Italy	80	87	92[2]	5.0	5.0
Israel	84	86	89[2]	1.9	4.7
United States	89	91	93	2.1	2.4

[1]Average annual DRRs are calculated for the actual number of years between "1950" and "1970" POLIs. These vary for individual countries as noted in Appendix C.
[2]Data from Appendix A. Treated as if for 1970.

Source: Morris David Morris, Measuring the Conditions of the World's Poor (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 75.

(countries) and across time. For example, we should examine the hypotheses of the "cultural determinists" who contend that cultural forces are significant influences of policy and policy outcomes.[35] Is there something embedded in the culture of certain countries or regions that impedes improvement in indicators of economic well-being such as the PQLI? We should also examine the views of "political determinists" who claim that political events, strong leaders or political movements and ideas are the crucial influences affecting governmental policies and policy outcomes. This breed of historical determinists would place less importance on the culture of say China and Russia and more on the impact of Lenin and Leninism, Mao and Maoism.[36]

Another constellation of historical forces worthy of greater consideration are socio-economic structures. Theda Skocpol's excellent analysis of the impact of these forces on post-revolutionary outcomes in China and the USSR is a good example of the type of comparative anslysis that can be done.[37] Although the Communist revolutions had significant impacts on the human condition in these two societies, Skocpol contends that contemporary policies and policy differences are tempered by the pre-revolutionary societal structures. Historical analysis of this sort is useful not only in explaining the past but is also likely to be helpful in understanding the present and future. The likely outcomes of China's recent "four modernizations" program may be better understood, for example, after viewing the goals and program with Skocpol's research in mind. The difficulties already encountered by the post-Mao moderates suggests that such policy choices can be heavily influenced by historical socio-structural forces. While leaders have some latitude, they are also influenced and often significantly constrained by the past.

Some policy choices and outcomes may be less affected by the past than others. For example, although complete PQLI data are not available for the

Communist period in China, available information suggests that the PQLI increased significantly under Mao. The Chinese communists were apparently rather effective in promoting this dimension of the human condition. Although historical forces no doubt influenced choices and outcomes, they did not rule out rapid social change. One of the central questions confronting comparativists is why some societies can undergo fundamental and rapid change, particularly in some policy areas such as economic well-being, while others appear to be so resistant to change. This and other equally important questions and relationships confront comparativists engaged in historical analysis.

Ideological Forces. What is the relationship between ideology and the human condition around the globe? Do symbols and ideas have a significant impact on the allocation of values and the course of human dignity? Although a cross-national and cross-temporal study by Lerner, de Sola Pool, and Lasswell did not address these questions explicitly, they identified ideological trends that have important implications involving fundamental choices between global warfare and human welfare. By comparing ideology--defined as the special vocabulary which a government elite uses to reveal its social goals--through content analysis in five countries (U.S., U.K., France, Germany, USSR) over a sixty year period (1890-1950), Lerner and his colleagues identified a disturbing trend toward a world of "garrison-prison states" and away from "a democratic international community."[38] They found this trend marked by a "parochialization of attention" and decreases in symbols naming, describing and advocating the social goal of human dignity. Similarly, Gerald and Patricia Mische describe a world of "national security states" motivated by militaristic competition and national leaders unable to move towards more humanistic, person-centered values and public policy.[39] If these purported trends in ideology and values

are true, they would seem to have obvious implications for the human condition and economic well-being. Certainly, when one examines contemporary military expenditures versus expenditures for foreign aid and international peacekeeping, the trends and impacts of increasingly militaristic ideologies seem apparent.[40]

Other studies have taken an explicit look at the relationship between ideology and policy. Anthony King examined a variety of policy areas in West Germany, France, Great Britain, Canada, and the U.S. in order to determine why the policies of some were distinctive.[41] He found that with the exception of education, the U.S. introduced all social services later and tended to spend less on them than did the other four western countries. According to King, the underlying reason was the enduring antistatist orientation in the American ideology. While many agree that ideology has a powerful impact on policy, others are more skeptical. Harold Wilensky has sought to refute the widely held contentions about the influence of ideology on welfarism.[42] His study suggested that ideology consistently adds nothing to understanding variations in social security systems. Seigel and Weinberg also question the impact of ideology by noting that "most of the strong advocates of 'ideological determinism' employ no quantitative evidence."[43] While the relationships are complex and the findings of various scholars mixed, the role of ideas and symbols appear to be important forces in the contemporary world. Their impacts on the value of well-being and the course of human dignity are worthy of continued attention.

Social and Economic Forces. The social and economic settings in a country, region or community are important determinants of the level of well-being. As some of Han Park's research has noted, social and economic forces are also related to other important dimensions of the human condition. In one

published essay, Park found significant relationships between a number of social and economic forces, what he referred to as indicators of modernization, and different indicators of human rights practices around the world.[44] Other social scientists have established relationships between social and economic forces and various aspects of political life. Karl Deutsch examined the relationship between social mobilization and political development,[45] Seymour Martin Lipset between economic development and democracy,[46] Han Park between the pace of socio-economic development and democratic performance,[47] and Benjamin and Kautsky between economic development and communism.[48] There is a healthy tradition of empirical research focusing on the social and economic forces of politics and policy. Students of global policy studies should not ignore it, but improve it, build upon it, and fill the existing gaps.

With respect to the relationship of economic development and governmental policies related to human welfare, a good deal of research suggests that the wealthier the nation, the greater proportion of its GNP will be spent for public consumption purposes. The comparative studies of Dawson, Robinson and others on American states call attention to the influence of economic forces.[49] Dye's research on the linkages between economic development variables, political system characteristics, and over 90 separate policy output measures in education, health, welfare, and so forth indicated that the economic development variables were powerful predictors of policy.[50] He concluded that on the whole economic resources were more influential in shaping state policies than any of the political variables previously thought to be important in policy determination.

However, Seigal and Weinberg argue that while this general relationship probably holds true for nation-states as well, a significant qualification ought to be recognized.[51] They argue that the relationship between economic wealth and policy outputs for public purposes appears to be strongest for nations undergoing the process of modernization. Why should this be the case? Frederick Pryor argues that modernizing countries confront a series of problems which leaders attempt to meet through greater public exertions.[52] The agenda for public policymaking expands dramatically as countries undergo economic development. Industrialization creates new infrastructural and social needs. However, after countries are relatively wealthy and industrialized, the impact of economic forces on governmental policy is reduced and the influence of political forces apparently expanded. This would suggest that decision-makers in developing countries are, to a considerable extent, captives of developmental imperatives. National policies and governmental expenditures are largely determined by, or are in response to, socio-economic forces. The ideas and strategies of leaders, the argument goes, are of relatively minor significance. If you want to change the human condition in developing countries, then, you try to change the socio-economic situation and worry less about political ideologies, national leaders, and governmental strategies. As noted above, Black, Paige and others would disagree with this notion, at least in part, and argue that leaders and politics can have a more powerful impact than the socio-economic determinists would suggest.[53] Obviously, more work needs to be done on what causes states and leaders to show greater concern for the welfare of their peoples.

There are others in addition to Dye and Pryor who argue that greater welfare spending is brought about by, or is in response to, socio-economic forces. Phillips Cutright concludes "that the introduction of social security

measures is a response by government to changes in the economic and social order."[54] In the Welfare State and Equality, Harold Wilensky concludes that economic development is the root cause of welfare state development.[55] Obviously, economic development does have a good deal to do with economic well-being. Morris' study, for example, found a strong positive relationship between countries' per capita GNP and the PQLI. Countries with low incomes tend to have low physical quality of life scores:[56]

	Average PQLI Score
Countries with per capita GNP under $300	40
Countries with per capita GNP $300-$699	67
Countries with per capita GNP $700-$1,999	68
Countries with per capita GNP $2,000 and over	92

The scatter diagram observations charted in Figure 2 outline the nature of the relationship between per capita GNP and PQLI. The correlation of .79 suggests that this particular economic force is strongly related to this particular dimension of the human condition. But are higher levels of economic development always related to higher quality of life indicators? The simple answer is no. While the relationship between per capita GNP and the PQLI is strong, the correlation is not 1.0. There are a number of significant deviations from the general pattern. Why? Why, for example, does Saudi Arabia with a per capita GNP of $3529 have a low PQLI score of 29? How is Costa Rica with a per capita income of only $884 able to achieve a relatively high PQLI of 85? And why did Iran and India have the same PQLI scores in the early 1970s even though Iran's per capita GNP was nine times higher than that of India? Finally, how has Ireland been able to achieve a PQLI equivalent to that of the U.S., even though its per capita income is about one third as large? These are interesting and important questions for comparativists. Some feel that many of the answers can be found in the political realm.

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Figure 2. Scatter Diagram Showing PQLI and Per Capita GNP (logged) Distribution, early 1970s



NOTE: Numbers correspond to the countries as ranked in Appendix B, Table 2 (p. 139).

Source: Morris David Morris, Measuring the Conditions of the World's Poor (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 65.

Political Culture and Political Participation. Does political culture--i.e., beliefs and attitudes concerning the proper allocation of values--have a significant impact on economic well-being? How does political participation impact on the allocation of the value of economic well-being in societies? Finally, are democratic systems--which theoretically show greater respect for citizen preferences and their articulation through various participatory forms--more responsive to the needs and interests of their people?

The linkages between political culture and public policy are complex and important. Some ideas about the impact of public opinion and political culture is found in democratic theories of popular government. V.O. Key has noted:

> Popular government has its peculiarities, one of which is the basis for the exercise of its authority: that governors shall seek out popular opinion, that they shall give it weight if not the determinative voice in decision, and that persons outside the government have a right to be heard. This legitimization of the view that the preferences of the governed shall be accorded weight by the governors constitutes the moral basis of popular government.[57]

Before exploring relationships, what do we know about political attitudes? As studies of American and political culture and public opinion abroad have discovered, public sentiment is often inconsistent, ephemeral, and sometimes even contradictory. Angus Campbell and his associates found in their study of American attitudes and opinion that many people who endorsed higher levels of public spending for social services were equally enthusiastic about the idea of lowering taxes.[58] Butler and Stokes examined the British public's reaction to a variety of problems facing the country and found that knowing an individual's

position on one issue was of little help in predicting how he or she would stand on any other.[59] Because of the inconsistent, ephemeral, and even contradictory nature of public attitudes, and the fact that there are significant differences among individuals and groups within the same political jurisdiction, efforts to gauge the impact of attitudes on policy outputs and outcomes is a difficult research task.

Although some like Almond and Verba and Verba, Nie, and Kim have undertaken cross-national studies of political culture and political participation and have linked them to significant political dependent variables (e.g., political stability in the Almond and Verba study),[60] few have related political culture to public policy and policy outcomes such as well-being. One important study that did, however, was "The International Studies of Values in Politics."[61] In a cross-national study of values in India, Poland, the United States and Yugoslavia, Phillip Jacob and his associates examined the relationships between the elite political culture of 400 local leaders and policy outputs in their locales. Specifically, they attempted to determine why some communities grow and progress while others stagnate, and how some satisfy social needs while others fail to serve civil goals. In other words, the study sought to determine what impact the values of local leaders had upon public vitality, social progress, and economic well-being. While Jacob and his associates found that political culture and values are overwhelmed in certain cases by other forces -- e.g., the impetus or constraint of economic resources or entrenched political authority and opposition--they concluded that there are in fact important political cultural influences on policy, progress, and the human condition.

What about citizen participation? What impact does political participation have on public expenditures and indicators of economic well-being? Nie and Verba define political participation as "those legal activities by private

citizens which are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and/or the actions they take. . . . We are basically interested in ... acts that aim at influencing governmental decisions . . . . We are abstractly interested in attempts to influence the authoritative allocation of values for a society."[62] Who has effectively or successfully linked participation to the allocation of values? No one to my knowledge, but some such as Jerry Hough have suggested some innovative ideas on how we might consider doing it.[63] This is an area for some exciting contextual analysis relating individual political attitudes and participatory behaviors to policy outputs such as governmental expenditures and outcomes such as the PQLI. While the research will be difficult, conceptually and practically, it is a promising area for students of global policy studies.

Political Structures and Institutions. Are there institutional or structural roots of public expenditures, economic well-being, human rights or inequality? Is there anything in the realm of political structures and institutions that will help us explain why India was able to have a PQLI similar to Iran's in the 1970s even though its per capita income was only one ninth as great as Iran's? Are there political structural factors that help us explain why have Bulgaria and Cuba been able to improve their PQLI levels substantially over the last 30 years while El Salvador and Egypt have not?

There are a number of scholars who suggest the importance of political structures and institutions. In Modern Politics in Britain and Sweden, Hugh Heclo describes structural characteristics that have produced different solutions and outcomes in these two countries.[64] A paper by Hayward attributes some of France and Britain's policy problems and shortcomings to "institutional inertia" and "political impetus."[65] Douglas Ashford calls attention to the influence of parliamentary factors by noting that when "looking at a variety of policy developments [in Britain] over the past two decades, it is remarkable

how each is affected in its conception, its evaluation, and its implementation by the needs of parliamentary government."[66] Phillips Cutright concludes that while the level of economic development best explains variation in social service coverage, political representativeness helps explain variations in social service programs among nations at similar levels of economic development.[67] Finally, Carl Friedrich characterizes constitutions as significant political forces.[68] Knowing about a country's constitution, Friedrich maintains, will tell us something about human rights, civil liberties and the human condition. While it is obvious that the presence or absence of a constitution, or bill of rights, does not predict with certainty the human rights practices of a country, the comparativist will want to determine why some constitutions are respected and others are not, why they have a positive impact on human rights policies in some countries and not in others.

Other scholars have explored interesting research questions that we ought to recognize and build upon in global policy studies. Some have examined the linkage between political system types and public policy. In an analysis of 21 developed and democratic systems, Guy Peters and his associates examined the relationship between four system types (depoliticized, consociational, centripetal, and centrifugal) and distributive, self-regulative, regulative and redistributive policies.[69] The findings indicated that centrifugal political systems displayed the highest level of distributional policies and the centripetal democracies displayed the highest level of self-regulative policies. Almost no distinction was found to exist between the policies of consociational and depoliticized democracies although the level of redistributional and regulative policies were higher in these states than in their centripetal and centrifugal counterparts. Although the methodology and conceptualization of the study have certain shortcomings, the findings about the influence of system type on

policy are interesting and important. At the very least, they recommend the need for improved conceptualization, more rigorous research, and further study.

Alexander Groth has made a compelling case in a couple of important studies that different political systems do in fact produce different outcomes. In the first, Groth characterizes government types as either pluralistic democracies, innovative mobilizing autocracies or traditional quiescent autocracies.[70] Examining both the benefits (e.g., public consumption expenditures) and burdens (e.g., taxation) of governmental policy, Groth contends that democracies distribute benefits and burdens more equitably among their citizens than either type of autocracy. Under traditional autocratic regimes, great inequalities were endemic in terms of consumption taxes, rate structures, and so forth, all of which tend to be discriminatory against the "have not" sectors of societies. Furthermore, allocations to public health, education and popular culture were found to be conspicuously low while bureaucratic and military allocations were found to be more generous. Overall, Groth found that "the gulf between 'ins' and 'outs' tends to be greater in authoritarian regimes than in democracies."[71] He concludes that all other things being equal, the type of political regime will affect an individual's social welfare.

In another interesting project, Alexander Groth attempted to determine the impact of system type (Marxist-Leninist vs. non-Marxist-Leninist) on policy.[72] Holding the level of economic development constant, Groth hypothesized that Marxist-Leninist states are likely to provide more substantive welfare benefits to industrial workers than world states generally. The hypothesis was tested comparing worker pensions and benefits in eleven Marxist-Leninist states with those of fifty nine non-socialist states. The comparison group consisted of all states whose GNP per capita fell between the lowest ranking state (PRC)

and the highest (Czechoslavakia). Groth concluded that Marxist-Leninist states provide higher levels of social welfare at lower direct cost to the worker than their non-Marxist counterparts and that political regime characteristics are important determinants of social welfare policy.

Groth's findings relate to our earlier query about the apparent success of Marxist-Leninist states in raising their PQLI levels. It seems to me that raising the level of social welfare has been a high priority goal in Marxist-Leninist states and the centralization of political authority within Communist Party systems, institutionally and structurally, has allowed a reasonably small group of political elites within Communist parties to see that it was done. This apparent success of Marxist-Leninist states in the welfare sector, however, is complemented by critical shortcomings in other areas. The events in Poland in 1980 and 1981 indicate that there are other concerns related to the human condition that are important to people. Although Polish workers have money to spend, there often is little to buy. Meat, produce and consumer goods in Poland are in short supply as they tend to be elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Polish citizens are also concerned about certain freedoms, human rights, and the role of the individual in the political system. That these are issues very much affected by the political system is suggested by the interest of the Polish workers in making basic fundamental changes in the structure of the system. An implicit assumption of the Polish workers' movement is that structural changes will result in an improvement in the human condition.

While some such as Dye and Pryor have questioned the importance of political variables,[73] the examples above and the research of Ashford, Heclo, Peters, Groth and others suggest their possible impact. It is apparent that institutions and structures, and other political forces to be discussed below, do impact on policy outputs and outcomes in certain policy areas, under certain circumstances,

in certain countries. Comparativists have much to do in sorting out more systematically the various political effects in their search for global patterns. While political engineering is now a primitive art, there is nothing that says it must remain so in the future.

The State, Political Actors and Policy-Making. Many scholars, particularly political scientists, feel that we make a mistake in underestimating the impact and power of the state, its leaders, and politics is not only affecting policy outputs, outcomes and the human condition, but also in affecting global and environmental forces. Some, such as Ashford, even suggest that policy can be viewed as a "cause" of politics.[74] The types of policies governments pursue supposedly structure the types of politics likely to ensue. If the government is attempting to enact redistributive measures, for example, the actors, arena and form of interaction will be different than if other types of policies were being considered.

Scholars such as Paige would encourage us to give more emphasis to the linkage between political forces and the dependent variables in Figure 1 and to also emphasize a feedback arrow running from the political forces to the global and environmental in order to call attention to the impact of political forces.[75] Paige argues that it is a mistake to consider politics and policy-making dependent variables and "prisoners" of their own tradition. He cites the role of politics in developing countries such as China and North and South Korea to show that political behavior can be conceived as a causal and relatively autonomous force in many cases. Others agree with Paige. Robert Vincent Daniels undertook a comparative study of the Russian and Chinese revolutions and concluded: "In present day communism, the political structure is not a reflection of the economic base, but its creator; political power and inspired willful leadership become the prime movers of history."[76] Mao

himself seemed to recognize the influence of political forces: "If we do not win,," he wrote in 1945," we will blame neither heaven nor earth, but only ourselfes."[77]

As noted earlier, Anthony King has conducted some more systematic research that examines a variety of political forces and relates them to public policy. One of the publications from this research asks what governments do and why they do them.[78] King notes that while the countries of North America and western Europe are often described similarly as welfare states, there are wide divergencies among them and these divergencies need to be explained. Among other things, King examines the role of the state in the United States, Canada, Britain, France and West Germany and asks how the states came to play the roles that they do. Modern governments in these states do a broad range of things. In addition to the conduct of defense and foreign affairs, they educate the young, provide social services, operate railways and manufacture steel, cigarettes, and other such things. In so doing, they probably have considerable impact on the economic well-being and human condition of their peoples.

King's research indicates that the five countries "have pursued policies that diverge widely, at least with respect to the size of the direct operating role of the state in the provision of public services."[79] As might be expected, the United States differs more from the other countries, and is likely to differ more in the years ahead, than they do from each other. Among other things, he found that the U.S. introduced most social services later and spent less on them than did its counterparts. Why is this so? Among other forces, King examines the role that political elites and interest groups might play in explaining these differences. It could be maintained, King argues, that government plays a smaller role in the U.S. because unlike the other four countries, the U.S. is dominated by an elite which wishes to inhibit the expansion of state activity and succeeds in doing so.[80] Although this may seem quite reasonable, particularly within the political context of the early 1980s and an antistatist Reagan administration, King argues that this elite explanation is really not plausible. The character and successful domination of elites did not seem to vary significantly among the five states during the time period King studied. Whether they do in the future and whether possible differences will be of consequence to the human condition is an interesting question. The antistatist strategy of the Reagan administration in the early 1980s seems to be more and more distinctive from other western democracies. Although the possible impact of the U.S. strategy on economic well-being is now unclear, it should be discernible in the years ahead.

King also asked whether the more limited U.S. role in social services might be explained by certain political actors such as interest groups which

have opposed and prevented the expansion of government.[81] After examining three propositions concerning the impact of interest groups--that interest groups have more resources in the U.S. than elsewhere, that U.S. interest groups are more concerned than others with keeping the state within narrow confines, that the institutional framework in the U.S. affords interest groups maximum opportunity to block state expansion--King concludes they are not all that important in explaining the distinctive U.S. policy position. Furthermore, neither are the institutional factors he considers. King finally concludes that the most satisfactory single explanation to the distinctive U.S. policy response to the welfare state is also the simplest: "the state plays a more limited role in America than elsewhere because Americans, more than other people, want it to play a limited role."[82]

While this finding lends support to our earlier consideration of both ideology, political culture and public opinion, it seems quite reasonable to expect the other political factors King considers to have an impact on policy in certain states, under certain circumstances, in certain issue areas. We should not generalize from his limited study that public opinion is the most important determinant of policy across time and space. What King's research should tell us is that through careful comparative study, we can make some progress in sorting out the apparent forces of policy.

A final study worth mentioning in this regard is a bold cross-national (125 states), cross-sectional (1968 data) study by Ghulam Haniff.[83] Haniff related such political variables as participation, party representation, competition, stability and party system to social policy outputs (e.g., percent of total national expenditures allocated to welfare programs) and social policy outcomes (e.g., number of physicians, average life expectancy, infant mortality and death rates). Though political conditions were found to

exert limited influence on social policy, the research does suggest some useful ways to operationalize political forces, policy outputs, and policy outcomes.

As a final note on political factors, we should call attention to the policy process itself. What impact does the way governments make policy have upon the human condition? In Comparing Political Systems, my co-authors and I argue that the policy-making process itself has much to do with a government's ability to achieve designated goals such as social development and economic well-being.[84] "Muddling through", the predominate mode of policy-making, seems to plague decision-making units around the world. Others are plagued by an error prone process of policy making that makes it particularly difficult to mobilize national resources for desired ends. Energy, resources, and ideas are wasted as such countries confront worsening economies with obvious costs to the people and to the human condition. On the other hand, some decision-making units are able to make policy in a more planned, rational, and comprehensive way. They systematically study policy goals and challenges, carefully consider alternative courses of action, and more effectively utilize resources to serve societal goals. In our estimation, politics is the art of the possible. It does make a difference.

Evaluating and Comparing Political Performance in Global Perspective

The preceding parts of the paper have viewed the subject of global policy studies and the human condition rather mechanistically. The discussion centered around a cybernetic approach to "inputs and outputs," or global, environmental and political forces, policy outputs and outcomes involving the human condition. In short, the presentation was more in the tradition of "pure" or positivist global policy science. I would like to note, however, that global policy

studies should do more than describe, analyze and explain; it should do more than examine the relationships outlined in Figure 1. Global policy studies should also evaluate and recommend, criticize and clarify, and engage in ethical and normative commentary. These missions raise a host of important questions.

First, can we analyze and evaluate governmental performance related to the human condition? Can we determine if capitalist economies are outperforming centrally planned economies in meeting basic human needs? Are socialist or capitalist systems more successful in promoting human dignity? Is the quality of life all its cracked up to be in Sweden and Switzerland? Do Italy, Turkey, Cambodia, Poland, and South Africa have as serious problems as are reported? Is their governmental performance of consequence to the human condition? In order to analyze, evaluate, and compare political performance, or what governments are doing to improve the human condition, we need both logic and standards for judging performance.

Standards vary between individuals, groups and societies around the world. What may be a reasonable level of economic well-being to a peasant in South America may be considered near poverty level in Western Europe. In addition, values like economic well-being and social justice, peace and ecological balance, take on a rather different significance depending on the society one considers. Furthermore, problems associated with these values like inequality or segregation, social conflict and environmental deterioration, take on a rather different meaning--sometimes these issues are not even considered problems--depending on whether we are talking about a Marxist-Leninist or a western state, a less developing or a post-industrial country. The values and problems take on diverse meanings not only because of their varying significance in different countries but also because of the way they are viewed, analyzed and evaluated. Inequality is considered a major problem and equality a high

priority in the People's Republic of China. The same issues are viewed rather differently in the U.S. How the issues are treated, what a government does to resolve problems, and how well a government performs depends very much on standards of judgment. Criteria of performance and standards of judgment are important concepts in global policy studies.

While the preceding sections of this paper argued for systematic study of global policy issues and the human condition, this final section suggests that we not overlook some important normative issues in global policy studies. When we talk about standards and evaluating political performance, "global monitoring systems" and "measuring conditions of the world's poor," we are drawing attention to the normative elements of our field of study. Unfortunately, most research and scholarly activity in political theory/philosophy and systematic political science/analysis go on in relative isolation. There are notable exceptions, of course, but more must be done in global policy studies to merge the normative issues of the philosophers and the scientific inquiry of the policy scientist. What is the good life? How do societies achieve it? Ideally, what we need in this emerging field are "philosopher-theorists-scientists-analysts." Policy scientists should not be blind to the unavoidable and critical normative and ethical implications of their studies.

Global policy scientists must also confront and comprehend the logic of evaluation. We must work from models and frameworks for evaluation. There can obviously be many models of appraisal. The model of the Marxist-Leninist will be different than that of the western democrat. The model of the political scientist will differ from the economist. The models used in law and medicine will be different than those that may be used in sociology, psychology or philosophy. The models of scholars working in separate disciplines will differ from those taking a truly multi-disciplinary approach. In all cases, however, we need an explicit, logically interconnected set of ideas and norms that allow us to evaluate, to compare, and recommend.

These ideas and norms, standards and criteria, then, will reflect different points of view, different disciplines, and different countries. My own feeling is that the standards and logic of evaluation need not be universal, and perhaps should not be universal. Rather, they and our evaluation studies should pay a healthy respect for the diversity found in the world and what different cultures and governments are trying to do. Charles Anderson notes: "A decent respect for the relativity of cultures and circumstances would seem to imply that an assessment of a government's intention is logically prior to an evaluation of its performance. The alternative is to risk normative ethnocentricity and ideological bias, if not sheer normative simple-mindedness."[85] Judging political performance against national goals and, on the other hand, against universal standards are both legitimate activities. However, it is important that the logic and standards of the evaluation be made explicit. As Charles Anderson writes: "It is one thing to render a judgment on a regime on the grounds that it failed to do what it set out to do, and quite another to rate it against some universal norm of political achievement. . . . Both . . . are appropriate to the agenda of comparative policy studies so long as we are clear about their implications."[86]

The proposal to establish a Global Monitoring System (GMS) and render judgments about political systems has some interesting implications concerning the possible role of evaluation in global policy studies.[87] The proposal is noteworthy for a number of reasons including its effort to merge systematic, scientific studies and more normative and ethical concerns. Those proposing the GMS system suggest that policy scientists ought to contribute to the sharing and shaping of values by promoting and participating in a GMS. The proposed system would be designed to appraise policy formulation and execution

by governmental actors on a global basis. Although the proposers talk more about evaluating national performance, they note that the idea is relevant to all levels of governance. The GMS system they propose would be a private, transnational organization (or more likely, a series of competing organizations) consisting of policy scientists from all over the globe. The evaluations would work to develop and use standardized indicators to monitor governmental actions and policy outcomes on professed official goals and on the attainment and distribution of basic human values.

The GMS proposers agree with Anderson that evaluating performance and rendering judgments on the basis of professed goals and universal standards are both ligitimate activities. To accomplish the former, they propose that we pay more attention to what leaders say, to the goals and standards they outline for their peoples and their own systems. Economic and developmental plans, party programs, and the like are examples of the sort of documents that ought to be studied. The proponents of the GMS system also argue that there are universal standards against which we can legitimately apprais and compare performance. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or a set of basic human values, can be used as international standards for gauging performance. The idea is that there are certain things leaders are and are not doing, and that they ought to be held responsible. Appraisal involves attribution of the responsibility of policy results.

The GMS system, then, suggests the possibility of global policy scientists from around the world participating collectively in assessing governmental performance in terms of policy processes and actual outcomes. Performance could be judged in terms of policy processes and actual outcomes. Performance could be judged in terms of both avowed goals and fundamental values associated with human dignity. This transnational effort would undertake systematic

projections of the probable consequences of current policy trends and disseminate the results of its studies on a periodic basis to concerned publics throughout the world. As a series of commentaries on the GMS proposal indicate, the idea has met with both support and optimism, criticism and pessimism.[88] Although the GMS may not be an idea whose time has come, it is an important and provocative proposal that ought to be taken seriously by students of global policy studies. Perhaps it is an idea whose time will come, and should come, if today's students lay the necessary philosophical, conceptual, and political groundwork for the future.

A noteworthy effort that has undertaken policy evaluation and comparison, on a global scale is Morris' project on Measuring the Conditions of the World's Poor.[89] Morris argues that as national and international concern for the needs of people mounts, it is becoming increasingly obvious that a new means of measuring the performance of countries is needed. Certainly, Morris argues, the traditional yardstick of economic performance--per capita GNP--does not provide adequate information about the life chances of individuals. Morris introduces a new indicator of social progress called the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI). As noted earlier, the PQLI can be used not only to look at relative performance among countries, but also to look at various sectors within countries. Are the needs of women being met as well as those of men? Rural and urban areas? Different ethnic groups? What changes have occurred over time? Obviously, economic resources and development have much to do with the physical quality of life. However, when used in conjunction with per capita GNP, the PQLI raises important questions that policymakers can not ignore. Again, why did Iran and India have the same PQLI in the early 1970s, even though Iran's per capita GNP was nine times higher than that of India?

Although not without problems and shortcomings, the PQLI makes some important contributions to policy-makers and policy scientists. Among other things, it does provide a reasonable measure of performance. The PQLI can be used by policy scientists in evaluation studies, by policy-makers in appraising their own performance and by others such as foreign aid donors in evaluating the impacts of their foreign assistance programs. The PQLI effort also provides a useful criterion for international decision-making, a tool for targeting and measuring social progress, and a stimulus for further research.[90] Obviously, there are important things the PQLI does not do. It does not measure economic growth, economic development, or total welfare. It does not measure effort or identify the need for, or measure the results of, individual projects. Even though there are many things it does not do, and even though it may pose more questions than it answers, the PQLI offers some exciting ideas about evaluation in the field of global policy studies.

Conclusion

When a field is new or in its formative stages, much work is initiated and carried out without the necessary support of formal theory. That seems to be where we are in global policy studies. Ideally, our observations, descriptions, comparative examinations of relationships, and evaluations will be planned activities and be guided by some recognizable logic and theory. It seems to me that there are some useful theoretical notions around, and many of them are either explicit or implicit in much of the work reviewed here. Yet, more work of a conceptual and theoretical nature needs to be done. We should re-examine "old" theories and attempt to build new theories. While the global problems and challenges to the human condition may magnify and

become ever more urgent, we should not ignore the importance of theory. Intelligently addressing practical policy problems--welfare and warfare, health and disease, food and starvation, ecological balance and environmental deterioration--requires a theoretical basis. Good policy scientists and good policymakers are guided by theory whether they recognize it or not. To suggest that there are urgent problems crying out for solutions should not be interpreted to mean a relaxation of scholarly and scientific rigor or to suggest the propriety of journalistic license and ideological polemic. Global policy scientists are different than journalists, they are not ideologues. Global policy studies must be guided by strenuous scholarly principles and rules.

Are the theoretical notions and ideas conceptualized in Figure 1 and described in the research and writings of others of any utility in our emerging field? Are they of any use as we engage in comparison, evaluation and prescription? Perhaps this is for others to judge, but the above is intended to be more than an academic exercise. To examine past research in terms of the suggested framework requires us to undertake some necessary tasks. It forces us to clarify, to analyze, to examine the contributions that others have made. I think it is important to build upon the past. This does not mean that we should prolong past inadequacies and mistakes, or needlessly stretch outdated work to fit the global challenges of today. But neither should we needlessly reinvent the wheel. Our scholarly inclinations for criticism and originality can work against the sort of cumulative building process that often characterizes the growth of knowledge. Much important normative, theoretical and applied work has been done. We should recognize it and build upon it.

Obviously global policy studies as conceived in this paper is a large order. The human condition is a broad concern and the forces that influence it nearly all encompassing. To address this overwhelming task, our efforts must be multi-disciplinary, cooperative, collaborative, and international in scope. Some efforts like the GMS proposal or efforts to measure the conditions of the world's poor should be macro, others will be micro. We must utilize our strengths and respect our interests. Many scholars will choose to work within the areas of their training and academic competence. Some political scientists will want to focus upon political forces, policy, and the human condition. Policy oriented economists such as John Rawls may want to focus on economic issues and theories of justice.[91] Philosophers and theorists may address their attention to the meaning of the human condition,[92] and empiricists to measuring it.[93] Although global policy studies is a large and seemingly complex field, it becomes much smaller and manageable if our work is intended to fit together. Relatedness is one of the assumptions of a field of study. Our work in global policy studies should be inter-related and cumulative. As in other fields of scholarly inquiry, progress will come through cross-fertilization, cooperation and cumulative research.

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If I were forced to sum up the arguments of this paper, they might be that, first, global policy studies should strive to tell us more about the human condition. We need to know more about the meaning of the human condition, its nature among individuals and groups, its causes and possible future on the planet Earth. Second, the rich traditions of comparative politics and comparative analysis have something to offer to our studies. We should recognize this work and see what it contributes to our evolving field. Third, in a broad and new field of inquiry like global policy studies, we need certain models, frameworks and theories to define, guide, and enrich our

studies. Fourth, we should not be impatient and expect unreasonably rapid progress. We should work independently and collectively, at micro and macro levels, on philosophical and practical problems. But if we have a field of study, we should work together. Fifth, what we do should be planned. There must be some level of agreement about the meaning and mission of the field. Hopefully, efforts like the one in which we are all involved may help us achieve it.

Finally, this paper is intended to start trains of thought, not stop them. In covering such a vast terrain I have slighted some matters, ignored others, and done injustices to many of them. However, because I view global policy studies as an evolving, cooperative area of inquiry, I am hopeful that we can address them in the future.

Footnotes

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[10]For the items and construction of the index, see Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures, 1980.

[11]Morris, Measuring the Conditions of the World's Poor.

[12]Although the index is generally used for cross-national comparison, computations can easily be made to allow the comparison of subgroup within societies.

[13]See the U.N.'s Demographic Yearbook and various statistical yearbooks published annually.

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